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URBAN CENTERS IN OROMIA:
CONSEQUENCES OF SPATIAL
CONCENTRATION OF POWER IN
MULTINATIONAL ETHIOPIA
Asafa Jalata
*?

T

his paper examines the essence and characteristics of cities and urban centers in Oromia (see
maps 1 and 2) and the major consequences of
the centralization and spatial concentration of Habasha
(Amhara-Tigray) political power in a multinational
Ethiopia. It specifically demonstrates how the integration
of indigenous Oromo towns into the Ethiopian colonial
structure and the formation of garrison and non-garrison
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cities and towns in Oromia consolidated Habasha political domination over the Oromo people. The Ethiopian
colonial structure limited the access of Oromo urban residents, who are a minority in their own cities and towns,
to institutions and opportunities, such as employment,
education, health, mass media and other public services.
In addition to exclusion, the Oromos have been prevented
from developing autonomous institutions, organizations,
culture, and language, and have been subordinated to the
institutions and organizations of the Habasha colonial
settlers in their own cities, towns, and homeland.
The issues of the Oromo urbanites cannot be sufficiently explained without locating them within larger
problems of the colonization of Oromia by the alliance
of Ethiopian settler colonialism and global imperialism.
This paper explores four interrelated issues: First, it outlines methodological and theoretical narratives. Second,
the paper specifically explains the evolution of indigenous Oromo urban centers and their integration into
the Ethiopian colonial structure and the development of
garrison and non-garrison cities and towns in Oromia.
Third, it identifies and examines the major consequences
of the spatial concentration of Amhara-Tigray political
power in the Oromo and Habasha urban communities in Oromia. Finally, the paper explains the features
of Oromian urban communities, the process of urban
underdevelopment, and the effects of political repression
and state terrorism on the Oromos.

Methodological and Theoretical
Narratives
Addressing the major consequences of the spatial
concentration of Habasha political power in the heart
40
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of Oromian cities and urban centers is a difficult and
complex task because of the paucity of adequate data1
and the methodological and theoretical challenges one
faces due to the problem of dealing with the two contradictory worlds of the Oromos and Habashas that are
interconnected and geographically located in the hearts
of Oromia. Historical and comparative methods are
used to address the root problems and the contradictions between the Oromo and Habasha communities in
Oromian cities and urban centers by locating them in the
regional and global political economy. These methods
assist us in exploring the historical origins and development of pre-colonial and colonial towns in Oromia, and
to historically situate, compare, and contrast the quality
of life for Oromo and Amhara-Tigray communities in
Oromian cities and urban centers.
This study uses critical, re-interpretative, comparative, and integrative modes of analyses. By using
an integrative and critical theoretical framework, this
research interconnects structural, cultural and behavioral approaches to explain the processes of policy formation and political action in order to determine why
there are differential qualities of life and public services
in the colonized and colonizing urban communities. Primarily structural approaches are rooted in Marxian and
Weberian modes of analyses that focus on the impact of
socio-economic relations in shaping political structures
and policies (see DiGaetano and Storm 2003, Skocpol
1973). Structural analysts are concerned with “historically rooted and materially based processes of distribution, conflict, power, and domination, thought to drive
social order and social change” (Lichbach 1997, 248).
The political economy approach, as one aspect of struc41
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tural modes of analyses, helps in identifying and explaining chains of factors that facilitate large-scale and longterm social, cultural, political, and economic changes.
Analysts who adopt the political economy approach
assume that “the most significant processes shaping
human identities, interests, and interaction are such
large-scale features of modernity as capitalist development, market rationality, state-building, secularization,
political and scientific revolution, and the acceleration
of instruments for the communication and diffusions of
ideas” (Katznelson 1997, 83).
The structural or political economy approach does
not adequately explain the behavioral and institutional
forms of the Ethiopian colonial elites and state structures. Cultural analysis of political systems however
can be used to explain the behavioral and institutional
forms of the colonizing structure. This analytic approach
provides assistance in understanding the basic values,
symbols and belief systems that provide “a system of
meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds,
large and small; . . . culture is the basis and political identity that affects how people line up and how they act
on wide range of matters” (Ross 1997, 42). According
to Alan DiGaetano and Elizabeth Strom (2003, 360),
“culture is linked to governance by ideological constructions through which participants in the political process
interpret local events. Such ideological orientations also
provide the core values upon which policy decisions are
made.” C. Stone (1989, 6) notes that governments are
based on “the informal arrangements by which public
bodies and private interests function together in order to
be able to make and carry out governing decisions.”
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Through integrating the structural context, political
culture, and political behavior in complex sets of relations
and networks that DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263)
call “the institutional milieus,” we can explore the impact
of the Ethiopian colonial institutions in general and garrison cities and towns in particular on the Oromo urbanites. According to DiGaetano and Strom (2003, 263),
Institutional milieus are the complexes of
formal and informal political and governmental
arrangements that mediate interactions among
the structural contexts, political culture, and
political actors. Formal institutional arrangements . . . include the governmental bodies . . .
and partnerships that give visible form to urban
governance through rules and organization.
Modes of governance [emphasis in original] are
the informal arrangements that define the governing relationships among and within formal
institutions implicated in urban politics.

The integration of structural, cultural, and behavioral
theoretical approaches is necessary to examine critically
the situations of Oromo and Habasha communities in
Oromian cities and urban centers.

Pre-colonial Urban Centers
in Oromia
This section explains the evolution of indigenous
Oromo urban centers, and how these centers became the
centers of Ethiopian colonial institutions and were used to
dominate, control and exploit the Oromo people. Urban
centers developed in pre-colonial Oromia because of the
development of the division of labor and the emergence
43
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of internal contradictions in Oromo society. Pre-colonial
Oromia had a small number of urban centers because
of the egalitarian political economy of Oromo society
which was similar to what Karl Polanyi (1944, 47-48)
calls “reciprocity and redistribution.” Urban centers and
cities emerged in class-based societies: “Without a central
power and a mechanism to generate a surplus over consumption and to concentrate it into urban areas, cities
cannot grow” (Gilbert and Gugler 1995, 14). Historian
Tesema Ta’a (1994, 678) asserts that in Western Oromia,
the major factors for the development of towns in the
first half of the nineteenth century were “further consolidation and centralization of the administration, extension of resource base, increase in agricultural production
and the flourishing of trade.” The development of settled
agriculture and the production of surplus food and other
materials and trade networks “release a portion of the
people from tasks of providing the elemental necessities
of life” (see Johnson 1972, 1-2).
The transformation of pastoral modes of life into
mixed and settled agriculture, the availability of surplus
food and wealth, the processes of class differentiation
and status group formation, the emergence of hereditary
leaders by replacing democratic leaders, and the development of marketplaces with networks of local and long
distance trade gradually led to the emergence of indigenous towns in Western Oromia (Ta’a 1994; Gemeda
1987; Tadasse 1983). The hereditary Leeqaa kingdoms
“developed and consolidated their political power using
better military organization, forging effective alliances,
controlling local economic resources and dominating
the long-distance trade as well as the main market villages” (Ta’a 1994, 676). The town of Naqamte2 emerged
44

Urban Centers in Oromia

Map 1: Oromia in the 1850s
Source: Mitchell, S. Augustus A System of Modern Geography
(Philadelphia: J.H. Butler and Company, 1875).

in this process. Before the emergence of Naqamte, the
gadaa government was centered in Komtoo. At that
time Naqamte was a qabiyyee of the Kolobo clan. Bakare
acquired Handaq when he was elected as the abba duulaa
of the Mananya’a and moved his residence to Waacha,
close to his new estate after dislodging Fido Bokisa.
Naqamte grew around this locale.
Naqamte gradually developed into a central marketplace where the people would exchange their products.
Long distance caravan merchants frequently traveled to
Naqamte in search of gold and ivory. The first monarchical leader of the Leeqaa Naqamte, Bakare Godana
established a hereditary local Oromo kingdom of
Leeqaa, ruling approximately between 1841 and 1868,
45
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by destroying the Oromo democratic system of administration. He developed Naqamte into a permanent place
and town. As soon as Bakare Godana “was elected as the
abba duulaa [war leader] of the Na’a lineage group, [he]
immediately started to ignore the basic tenets of the customary gadaa rules and regulations and [undermined]
the superior powers of the abba boku [the main leader].
He gathered many followers and organized them into
an effective [strike] force and entered into repeated conflicts with Fido Bokkisa, the contemporary abba boku”
(Ta’a 1994, 677).
Bakare forced Fido Bokkisa to flee, controlling areas
around Naqamte, such as Waacha.3 Bakare established
this settlement and consolidated his political and social
organization by recruiting permanent body guards and
soldiers. When he died in 1868, about 2000 people lived
around Naqamte (Ta’a 1994, 678). The development and
enlargement of Naqamte continued under the administration of his successors Moroda Bakare (r. 1868-1889)
and Kumsa Moroda (1889-1923). It was during Kumsa’s
administration that European travelers, merchants, and
a few Ethiopians visited Naqamate and provided eyewitness accounts on the town. During the last decade of the
nineteenth century, Weld Blundel (1900, 13), a British
traveler, noted that “Nakamte is a large scattered town
of some 40,000 inhabitants, situated on an undulating
ground, with all the evidence of prosperity. All kinds of
produce corn and honey being principal and large quantities of cotton . . . iron and copper metal from the west
are to be seen in the market.” Another traveler, Hugues
Le Roux (1902, 310-311), a French traveler, was amazed
by the buildings in Naqamte and their various shapes
and sizes. He witnessed that “a high density of popula46
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tion living in compact villages in and around” the city
(quoted in Ta’a 1994, 680). C.W. Major Gwynn (1937)
admired how Naqamte was flourishing. Further, E.J.
Bartleet (1934, 65) described how this city had commercial networks with Gojjam, Shawa, Bella Shangul,
the Sudan, and Dembi Dollo, and had developed into
an important and prosperous city. Adrien Zervos (1936,
397-399) described that because Naqamte was a very significant commercial center about seventy foreign merchants established import-export agencies in the city.
The foreign merchants included Indians, Greeks, Lebanese, Armenians, Americans, and Arabs. The Swedish
Evangelical Missionaries also opened a church, a hospital, and an elementary school in the city. There were
indigenous settlements and towns similar to Nagamte
in other parts of Oromia. Towns like Saqa, Jimma, Billo,
Assandabo, Dappo, and Dembi Dollo developed during
the nineteenth century.
South of Naqamte, Saqa emerged as the seat of the
ruler of Limmu and as a local market in the early nineteenth century. As a center of commerce, Saqa was connected to Kafa and other Oromo kingdoms, Gojjam,
and Gondar (Gemeda 1987, 30). The population of this
city was estimated between ten and twelve thousand.
Saqa declined in the late nineteenth century because
of the weakening of the kingdom of Limmu and the
emergence of other settlements and towns like Jimma
and Billo (Gemeda 1987, 30). During the second half
of the nineteenth century, Billo emerged as a main marketplace between the Gibe region and Gojjam. Several
caravan merchants visited Billo and passed through it.
Another important city was Jimma, the city that evolved
from Hirmata and Jiren (see Map 2) settlements in the
47
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middle of the nineteenth century as the commercial and
administrative center of the Oromo kingdom of Jimma
(Gemeda 1987, 32). Abba Jifar I (c. 1830-1854) selected
Jiren as the political capital of his kingdom and his main
mesera (residence), and Hirmata as the main market
(Gaba Gifti) of his kingdom. While merchants lived in
Hirmata, the mootti (King), his family, and followers
lived in Jiren.
European travelers, such as Soleillet, Jules Borelli, Leopoldo Traversi, and Alexander Bulatovich (2000) stayed
in Jiren at the court of the King. Later, Mendera emerged
as the main residential area of the merchants and their
agents; the merchants and their agents who were living in
Mendera in 1911 included Dubail, a Swiss; Guingnions, a
French; and Ydlibi, a Syrian (Gemeda 1987, 33). Further,
Indian, Arab, and American merchants opened shops for
their agents in the 1920s in Mendera.
Another urban center that emerged in the late nineteenth century was Dembi Dollo; this town also evolved
from a marketplace. After struggling with its competitors,
such as Abba Ghimbi, Abba Dassa and Burayu, Jote Tulu
of Gidami brought Dembi Dollo under his administration (Tadasse 1983). After the death of Jote in 1918,
Leeqaa Qellem and Sayyoo fell under the direct control
of the Abyssinian colonial administration, and Habasha
settlers began to arrive and establish the nafxayna-gabbar
system. The expropriation of Oromo lands by Ethiopian
colonial settlers, and the intensification of taxation, and
the inability of Oromos to pay heavy taxes forced many of
them to migrate to Dembi Dollo in search of jobs, such as
porterage (Tadasse 1983, 26). The Greeks introduced new
ways of constructing houses; sawmills; the knowledge of
making blocks of sandstone; production of various fruits
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and crops, such as rice, mangoes, bananas, oranges, apricots, etc.; sewing and sewing machines; bakeries; hotels;
cheese making; and so forth. There were also other Europeans and Americans who introduced some innovations
to the city of Dembi Dollo. There was an Italian sawmill
in 1919 near Dembi Dollo. The Italian Catholic mission
built sawmills in Sakko to the west of Dembi Dollo. The
American mission was established in 1919 and built a
school, a hospital, and churches. Both the American and
Catholic Italian missions introduced a modern education,
health care, and Christianity to Dembi Dollo.
Land alienation and heavy land taxes forced Oromos
to seek employment with Greek merchants, and poor
Oromos became porters to transport goods between
Dembi Dollo and Gambella. The first missionaries were
medical doctors who combined religious gospel and
medicine; they trained Oromo teachers and preachers to
spread the Christian gospel among the Oromo community of the region. There are other pre-conquest Oromian
cities that are not included in this paper due to lack of data.
After Oromia was effectively colonized by the Habasha,
indigenous Oromo urban centers were converted into garrison towns and became the center of the Ethiopian colonial administration. In these processes Oromos became
a numerical and political minority in their own urban
centers and culturally and economically subordinated to
Habasha communities as we will see below.

The Development Garrison and nonGarrison Towns
The chains of factors that facilitated the development of both garrison and non-garrison cities and towns
(see Map 2) included capitalist penetration; Abyssinian
49
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colonial expansion, including the need to control strategic centers and the caravan trade as well as natural and
human resources; the introduction of innovations, such
as the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway line (see Map 2);
and modern transportation and communication systems
(see Benti 1988, 2000; Jalata 1993; Koehn and Koehn
1979). Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler (1995, 16) note
that “without the intrusion of industrial capitalism and
imperialism some Third World societies would still lack
major cities. In major parts of America and Africa urban
development was superimposed by capitalism on essentially rural areas.” Just as European colonialists founded
cities that reflected their power structures and protected
their interests in their colonies, the Ethiopian colonialists created or developed urban centers and cities that
they used for colonial domination and surplus extraction
from Oromia. Gilbert and Gugler (1995, 18) correctly
characterize such cities and urban centers as an “instrument of conquest.”
The Ethiopian colonial settlers created garrison
towns and cities known as katamas in strategically and
politically secured regions and brought the existing
Oromo urban centers under their control. John Murray
(1922, 35) points that “Convinced that much more
was to be made out of the helpless Galla [Oromo] by
their permanent exploitation, he [Menelik] began . . .
to occupy the districts that he overran with permanent
garrisons of his troops, providing at the same time for
their administration under a hierarchy of his own officials.” Initially, Menelik, the founder of the Ethiopian
Empire, developed garrison towns, such as Ankobar,
Dabra Berhan, and Angolala in the mid-nineteenth
century; the last was burned by the Oromo in 1868,
50
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Map 2: Railway Towns and Garrison Towns
Source: Akalou Wolde-Michael, “Urban Development in Ethiopia, (1889-1925) Early Phase,” The Journal of Ethiopian Studies,
vol. Xi, no., 1 (1973), p. 1.
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but recovered by Menelik. He also developed Leche,
Feqre Gimb, Enaware, Tamo, and Warra Illu. Similarly,
Yohannes founded Dase in northern Oromia in 1883.
Menelik consolidated his garrison town of Warra Illu
(see Map 2) in Wallo, northern Oromia, in 1870 and
installed 40,000 soldiers there (Pankhurst 1985, 226); in
the same year, the Wallo Oromo attacked and destroyed
it. There were several Europeans at the re-created Warra
Illu garrison town in 1879. The Wallo Oromo set fire to
this town again and destroyed it in the same year.
Northern Oromia (north of Addis Ababa, see Map
3) gradually fell into Ethiopian hands. After bringing
this strategically and politically significant region under
his control, Menelik turned his attention to the Tulama
Oromo who were residents of Finfinnee (currently Addis
Ababa, see maps 1 and 2) and its surroundings (see Map
1). With the further colonization of the Oromo, the
building of more katamas became essential. Richard
Pankhurst (1977, 231) comments that “the desire to
exercise more effective control over the Oromo . . . led
Menilek [sic] in the latter part of 1878 to move further
to the mountain of Wacaca where he dug the foundations
for a new town.” He named this garrison town Entoto
(later called Old Entoto). In 1882, Menelik transferred
his settlement to a strategically and politically important place called Dildila and later named New Entoto.
These settlements were created by evacuating or enslaving the Oromo living there (Pankhurst 1977, 232). After
strengthening his army and accumulating massive firearms, Menelik built Addis Ababa, on the place known
by the Oromo name Finfinnee, between 1886 and 1887
without primary consideration of strategy. Addis Ababa
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emerged as the capital city of the Ethiopian Empire in
the heart of Oromia.
The major portion of Oromo land on which this
capital city was founded was owned by thirty-one
Ethiopian officials (Pankhurst 1985, 204). The army
commanders were given a large plots of lands on which
they established their respective camps for their relatives,
followers, and war captives (Benti 2000, 64). While
most Oromos were evicted and forced to migrate to
far places, others were permanently marginalized and
turned into servants and laborers (Benti 2000, 278).
Some Europeans and others had obtained Oromo
lands from Menelik before the merchandization of land
by giving him gifts. However, by the proclamation of
October 27, 1907, Oromo land became a commodity
to be sold and bought. This proclamation “gave Ethiopian and foreign [European] landlords a great deal more
security of tenure” (Garretson 1974, 116). Some of these
Europeans bought tracts of land and built their houses,
shops, and offices. Making Addis Ababa the center of
commerce, bureaucracy, and employment, the Ethiopian
government attracted people from different parts of the
world and Abyssinia proper to this city while the Oromo
people were marginalized, segregated, and dehumanized
in rural and urban areas alike. The people in the city
mainly obtained their food and income from the surrounding Oromos; military commanders, soldiers, followers depended on the tribute and tax mainly collected
from the Oromo people (Benti 2000, 54).
Gradually, Addis Abba gained regional and international importance. Several continental and international
organizations made this capital city their center without
recognizing the existence and suffering of the Oromo
53
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people. Most countries opened their embassies and nongovernmental agencies in Addis Ababa without considering the interest of the Oromo people. International merchants from Europe, Asia, and Arabia migrated to and
dominated commercial activities in Addis Ababa and
major towns. In 1899, there were three important shops
in Addis Ababa; these were owned and operated by three
French merchants (Pankhurst 1967, 53). Indian, Greek,
Arab, and Armenian merchants became dominant in
trade. These merchants expanded their operations to
provincial towns. These non-African merchants “combined import-export businesses which were very profitable” (Pankhurst 1968, 399). Legesse Lemma (1979,
106) asserts that “West Europeans, mainly French and
British, were engaged in high finance and international
trade, while Arabs, Armenians, Indians and Greeks participated in relatively small-scale commerce.”
Addis Ababa was established at the crossroads of
important trade routes from south to north and from
east to west. It became the hub of the trade routes to
Assab, Djibouti, Zeila, and Berbera, the Sudan through
Wallaga, Gojjam, Ankobar, and Gondar, to Wallo and
Massawa, and to Gambella. These routes connected the
Ethiopian Empire with the British, Italian, and French
colonies that completely surrounded it. With the centralization of Ethiopian power and the control of the
market system, the colonialists benefitted from trade
at community, regional, and central levels and strictly
administered marketplaces to collect taxes and customs
duties. While Ethiopians, Europeans, and others had
representatives in Addis Ababa city affairs and “shared
certain privileges of accessibility to and protection of
the Emperor,” the Oromos were placed under direct
54
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Ethiopian military rule (Garretson, 1974, 168-183). By
granting concessions to European capitalists, the state
introduced modern innovations, such as a railway, a few
roads, a telephone and telegraph system, a postal system,
a bank, the first modern school, and the first hospital.
By establishing his court in Finfinnee (Addis Ababa),
Menelik “directed the administration . . . and governed
the newly conquered Galla country [Oromia] and his
acquisitions through the military officers in charge of
the garrisons of his own troops, whom he could appoint
and dismiss at his pleasure” (Murray 1922, 41). About
Oromia and other colonized regions, Harold Marcus
(1971, 165) says this: “Not only were these territories
effectively occupied and policed, but they were also being
economically and politically integrated into . . . Ethiopia.” The colonization of Oromia, the development of
the transportation and communication systems, and the
establishment of Addis Ababa and garrison towns facilitated the development of the Ethiopian institutional
milieu and created “the integrating nucleus of the colonial economic system” (Althabe 1964, 1-3) in Oromia
with the collusion of the capitalist world economy.
Commodities and food products produced by Oromo
labor flowed to and were concentrated in Addis Ababa
and other urban centers for local consumption and
international markets. According to Gilbert and Gugler
(1995, 15), “the development of the world economy . . .
created an interlinked economic system [in which] different cities perform the roles allocated to them within
that system.”
The Abyssinian colonial settlers also built garrison
towns like Gore, Jijiga, Asaba Teferi, Assala, Goba, and
others in Oromia (see map, p. 3). These fortified settle55
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ments had strong connections among themselves and
with Addis Ababa in order to assist one another during
emergencies. Although these towns were very backward
compared to the European towns built in other parts of
Africa during the colonial period, “the colonial structure . . . created a very special type of town: the centre
of trade in goods and of colonial power, the town is the
reflection, both economic and sociological, of colonial
domination” (Althabe 1964, 3). Since there was no color
line between the colonizer and the colonized peoples,
as between Europeans and Africans, many scholars have
failed to understand this colonial situation. The garrison towns gradually evolved into the major geopolitical
centers for practicing political domination, wealth and
capital accumulation, and religious and cultural dissemination. Akalou Wolde-Michael (1973, 10) describes
that with Ethiopia’s colonial expansion “garrisons were
set up all over newly acquired territories to hold down
the conquered people. To maintain the army, part of the
conquered land and, indeed, even the conquered people
themselves as gabbars [semi-slaves] were assigned to the
soldiers” and colonial officials.
From these garrison centers Ethiopian soldiers and
colonial administrators were dispatched to impose colonial rule on Oromos through subjugation, enslavement,
and expropriation of the basic means of production such
as land, cattle, and other valuable resources. With products collected from Oromia and other regions, Menelik
continuously purchased quantities of weapons and military expertise from Europe (see Jalata 1993). Further,
products in the form of gold, grain, cattle, honey, and
slaves were channeled to Ethiopian colonial settlers in
Oromian urban centers and towns. The colonialists
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gradually developed these urban centers into towns by
using Oromo economic resources and labor and by building regulatory and service institutions such as offices,
prisons, churches, medical and communication facilities, and schools. Several non-garrison towns emerged
in eastern and western Oromia with the development of
trade and communication networks. As rail service was
introduced, the towns of Aqaqi, Bishoftu, Mojo, Adama,
Walanchiti, Metahara, Awash, Mieso, Afdem, Gota,
Munesa, and Dire Dawa (see Map 2) flourished.
While Oromos were evicted from their urban lands
and forced to migrate to rural areas, Abyssinians were
encouraged to migrate to cities and towns in Oromia.
These processes were started by Menelik and have continued into the present. Menelik encouraged the migration
of Abyssinians to the colonized areas in the late nineteenth century and the turn of the twentieth century. The
great famines in Abyssinia proper also pushed people to
migrate to Oromia and other colonized areas (Benti,
1988, 133). According to Charles W. McCllelan (1978,
111-112), “Menelik’s redistribution of . . . resources had
two major foci: one involved the movement of resources
directly to the north [Abyssinia] for reallocation there;
the other, the movement of needy northerners to the
south [mainly Oromia] to be provisioned with noncommercial resources.” To solve economic and famine
problems in Ethiopia proper, Menelik sent a series of
large expeditions to Oromia. Harold Marcus (1975,
64-65) argues that “Expeditions were often organized
during times of famine, when numerous refugees went
along to settle in newly conquered lands along with the
soldiers who stayed behind to garrison the fortified villages (katamas) erected as control points.” Further, the
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domination of institutions by Habashas and the glorification of the Amharic language, Orthodox Christianity,
and Habasha culture encouraged the migration of more
Ethiopians to Oromian cities and towns.

The Consequences of the
Centralization of Habasha
Political Power
The Ethiopian colonial state made Oromian cities
and towns attractive to Ethiopians by providing them
with land and by building churches, schools, hospitals,
and supplying other social amenities. These favorable
conditions enabled the Amharas to become the majority in most cities and consider themselves as hosts, and
Oromos as outsiders and foreigners (see O’Connor 1983,
108). Social amenities, such as health services, transportation, and communication facilities, employment
opportunities, industries concentrated in major cities
and urban centers. For instance, there were 93 health
centers and 649 clinics in Addis Ababa before 1974
(Benti 2000, 177). Menelik II Hospital was opened in
1910, Ras Tafari Makonnen Hospital in 1922, Empress
Zawditu Hospital and Ras Dasta Damtew Hospital in
1931,Tesema Imperial Body Guard Hospital in1944,
St. Paul Hospital in 1947, and Dejach Balcha Hospital
in 1948. Omedla (police) Hospital, Takle Haimonat
Hospital, Princess Tsehai Memorial Hospital and other
health centers and clinics were opened and concentrated
in the same city. In the 1990s, there were 91 hospitals,
187 health centers, and 2,470 health stations in the
Ethiopian Empire, and almost all of them were located
in cities (Benti 2000, 182; Ministry of Ethiopia, 1995).
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Oromos have been denied meaningful access to these
hospitals and other health services, schools, colleges, and
universities in Oromian cities and urban centers. In their
own country and urban centers, Oromos have become
foreigners and are even discouraged from migrating to
larger cities (Benti 2001, 159). Oromian cities and town
have been numerically, politically, economically, and culturally dominated by Abyssinians. For instance, in 1978,
about 59 percent of the Addis Ababa population was
Amharas and Tigrayans, 17 percent were Oromos, 17
percent were Gurages, cumulatively about 94 percent of
the 1.1 million urban population (Benti 2000, 265). In
1994, almost 58 percent of the Addis Ababa populations
were Amhara and Tigrayans (i.e., 48.3 and 7.6 percent
respectively) and almost 20 percent were Oromos out of
the population of 1 million (Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority, 1994, 44). Even in the two cities, namely
Harar and Dire Dawa, where the Oromos are almost
the majority ethnonational group (i.e., 52.3 percent and
48.0 percent respectively), they do not have political
power and are denied the right to develop their institutions, language and culture. The manifestation of Oromo
identity and language was not allowed in Oromian cities
and towns until Oromo nationalists started to resist
such colonial and racist policies in an organized way.
In Oromian cities and town, the Oromo language was
discouraged and despised and the Amharic language was
glorified and became the official language of the Ethiopian empire (see Benti 2001, 158).
When people from different parts of the world visit
Oromian cities and towns, they don’t come into direct
contact with the Oromo people, their culture, history
and civilization. As Oromia was removed from the world
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map by colonization, the Oromo people and their culture
were removed from Oromian cities and towns through
systematic government policies. The Ethiopian government made the culture and language of the Amhara the
symbol and the defining trait of Ethiopian identity and
nationalism. It prohibited the writing, broadcasting or
speaking at public functions in the Oromo language as
a part of its attempt to culturally assimilate the Oromo
into the Amhara identity without structurally assimilating them (see Markakis 1994, 225). The Ethiopian
state has been rooted in the Amhara-Tigrayan culture,
language and Orthodox Christianity, and these characteristics were reflected in Oromian cities and towns.
The Abyssinian colonial settlers created two worlds in
different centers of Oromia: The world of those who
have socially, politically, economically, and culturally
dominated Oromian cities and towns, and the world of
the people who lost their country and have become marginalized and impoverished. Only a few Oromos, who
have collaborated with the Ethiopian colonial system,
have escaped this humiliation. The Ethiopian government made it a requirement that Oromos and others
who sought “upward mobility must do so within the
Amhara cultural framework” (Shack 1973, 276).
Until they learned to speak Amharic, Oromos were
denied employment in the government bureaucracy and
the service industry (Benti 2001, 158-161). But ordinary
Amharas and Tigrayans even without formal education could get different kinds of jobs in Oromian cities
and towns because they spoke Amharic and they were
members of the ethnonational group that dominated the
institutions of government and business (Benti 2001,
161). In the early 1960s, Girma Amare (1963, 340), an
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Amhara bureaucrat, declared that Oromos and others
“wishing to obtain a position in government offices [are]
required to have a good command of Amharic.” More
than 60 percent of government bureaucrats, 75 of army
officers, and 70 percent of governors in the colonized
regions were Amharas by 1974 (Michael 1989, 71).
Most of these positions are filled by Tigrayans today,
since they took state power from the Amharas in 1991.
Because the Oromos in cities and towns and rural areas
do not have institutional and organizational control over
their land and what they produce and their labor, they
do not receive the benefits that can improve their quality
of life. The Oromos live under Ethiopian political repression, darkness of ignorance, and poverty.4
Since urban areas and cities in Oromia are primarily populated by Ethiopian colonial settlers and their
collaborators, they are the ones who have access to the
limited public facilities such as schools and hospitals.
Oromo urbanites like their rural counterparts have
been exposed to massive and absolute poverty and
have been denied their fundamental human rights and
needs that Ron Shiffman (1995, 6-8) calls subsistence,
protection, affection, and understanding. Most Oromos
in urban and rural areas have low levels of subsistence
because they lack adequate income, enough food, and
livable homes. They do not have protection from disease
because they are denied adequate access to health and
medical services. They do not have protection from
political violence because the Ethiopian state engages
in massive human rights violations and state terrorism
( Jalata 2000). Oromos have been ruled by successive
authoritarian-terrorist regimes5 which have exploited
and impoverished them by expropriating their resources.
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Successive Ethiopian regimes have not had any concern
and affection for the Oromo people because they have
been considered inferior people who do not deserve
basic human rights ( Jalata 2001). Oromos have been
denied their inalienable right to self-determination and
democracy. They have been denied the right to build
their social, economic, cultural and organizational infrastructure.
Without political freedom, democracy, and a legitimate government, a community cannot improve its
quality of life. People like the Oromos who do not have
personal and public safety in their homes and communities, and who are denied the freedom of expression, association, and organization, are denied a good quality of
life. In the twenty first century, when the world is changing quickly because of the intensification of globalization,
social revolutions, as well as revolutions in technology,
information, communication, and transportation, the
Oromo people are relegated to the darkness of ignorance
and poverty. Because of the magnitude of the problems of
the Oromo people, it is impossible to provide a numerical face to the devastating effects of poverty, suffering,
hunger, malnutrition, starvation, sickness, illiteracy and
ignorance, alienation, and hopelessness. Because the
majority of Oromo urbanites face these problems, they
are underdeveloped.6 When a community or a society
lacks independence or autonomy to determine its political destiny through self-determination and democracy, it
is confronted with the problems of underdevelopment,
which is characterized as powerlessness, victimization,
illiteracy, poverty, and other forms of socioeconomic
crises (see Rodney 1982).
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Reaction to Political Repression in
Urban Centers
Beginning in the 1960s, the migration of a few
Oromos to urban areas brought about some changes.
These migrants brought the Oromo language and culture
to Oromian cities and towns. Some Oromo elites who
were trained to be intermediaries started to recognize
their lack of equal citizenship rights and the mistreatment of the Oromo people. Despite their individual
achievements, these elites were given an inferior status
to Ethiopians due to their Oromo identity. They started
to form urban self-help associations because organizing a
political party was not allowed. These self-help associations were united to form the Macha-Tulama Self-Help
Association. The formation of the Macha-Tulama SelfHelp Association in the year 1963-1964 marked the
beginning of building urban community efforts to solve
Oromo problems and the public rise of Oromo nationalism. The Oromo elites, by forming this association in
Addis Ababa, started to express the collective grievances
of the Oromo people, and to formulate programs to
solve some economic, social and educational problems
of Oromo society.
In May 1966, the leaders of the association at one of
its meetings, articulated that: “(1) less than one percent
of Oromo school age children ever get the opportunity
to go to school; (2) . . . less than one percent of the
Oromo population get adequate medical services; (3) .
. . less than fifty percent of the Oromo population own
land [currently all Oromos are landless since the Ethiopian state owns Oromo land]; (4) . . . a very small percentage of the Oromo population has access to communication services. [And yet] the Oromo paid more than
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eighty percent of the taxes for education, health, and
communication” (Quoted in Hassen 1998, 205-206).
The Ethiopian colonial state and the Ethiopian settlers
in Oromia did not tolerate any manifestation of Oromo
identity by either association or organization. To stop
the development of Oromo consciousness and collective
efforts, the Ethiopian government banned the Macha
and Tulama Association in 1967, killed or imprisoned its
leaders, and prevented Oromo urbanites from organizing and developing their communities. The banning of
this association forced Oromo nationalism to go underground. These events forced some Oromo nationalists to
go underground in Oromia; others went to Somalia, the
Middle East, and other countries to continue the Oromo
national movement. They clandestinely produced political pamphlets.7

Conclusion
At the beginning of the twenty first century, in Third
World countries like Ethiopia, modern facilities, technologies, and public services are concentrated in cities
and urban centers. The intensification of globalization as
well as revolutions in transportation and communication
technologies has allowed local and regional cities access
to global cities and their services. The Oromos who are
marginalized and impoverished in their own cities and
towns have not received adequate benefit from the new
technological and global changes. The Ethiopian state
elites and the Ethiopian urban communities in Oromia
are determined to maintain the existing political and
economic order by investing meager available resources
in building unproductive institutions, such as the army,
security infrastructure and colonial bureaucracy. The
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remaining economic resources are consumed or invested
in social services that mainly benefit the Habashas.
Under these conditions, the chance to improve the
quality of life through investing in Oromo communities is nonexistent. By dominating the Ethiopian political economy and centralizing and concentrating state
power, successive Ethiopian regimes have formulated
and implemented policies that benefit Habasha elites
at the expense of Oromos and other colonized peoples.
Ethiopian rulers, Menelik, Haile Selassie, Mengistu Haile
Mariam, and Meles Zenawi, have caused the destruction of millions of lives to promote “their own personal
advancement over and above the goals and aspirations of
their followers and Ethiopians in general” (Hagos 1995,
vii). These leaders have been more concerned with a
“ferocious love of material and worldly comfort,” while
ignoring the welfare of the people (Hagos 1995, 131).
They have privatized and ethnicized public power, and
used it for destroying rather than building a country.
The fundamental resolution of the contradictions
between Oromo and Habasha urban communities
requires the implementation of the principles of selfdetermination and multicultural democracy. Without
an accountable, democratic and legitimate state, various
population groups in Oromian cities and towns and the
colonized regions may soon face dangerous conditions
similar to Rwanda, Congo, and the former Yugoslavia.
Today millions of Oromos are exposed to fatal diseases
(including HIV/AID), famine and massive poverty
in Oromian cities and urban centers. Since state-terrorism, poverty, famine, and ethnonational challenges
are increasing and since the major world powers have a
role in shaping these problems, they have a moral and
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Map 3: Modern Oromia
Source: The Oromo Commentary 1991. Reprinted with permission.

political responsibility to become capable of mediating
these processes and developing procedures and criteria
by which these conflicts must be solved fairly and democratically before it is too late. On its part, while promoting the principles of self-determination and democracy,
the Oromo leadership must demonstrate that the Oromo
people because of their democratic tradition, demographic size, geographic location, and cultural ties with
other oppressed ethnonations can play their constructive
role in establishing a multinational democratic society
and in bringing a just and durable peace. Whether they
like it or not, the fates of Oromo and Habasha urban
communities in Oromia are interconnected. Therefore,
these two communities should start a constructive dia66

Urban Centers in Oromia

logue as equal partners and search for a common ground
to work together to reorganize the existing urban political and economic arrangements to improve the quality
of life, social services, and community development for
all the people without exclusion and discrimination. As
Habasha urban communities need to dissociate themselves from the ethnocratic Ethiopian state, the Oromo
urbanites need to make constant efforts to demonstrate
that they can democratically work with the Habasha
communities without revenge and exclusion.
Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

These sensitive issues have been avoided by Ethiopian
Central Statistical Authority. Because of censorship by the
Ethiopian government, Oromo scholars and others who
are interested in Oromo issues cannot collect information on the disparities in quality of life and public services
between Oromo and Amhara communities in Oromia.
Naqamte was the center of gadaa at which the Leeqaa
Oromos and their elected leaders administered their
economic, political and religious services. It was there
where “the gada officials gave justice deliberated on the
defense of their territory and held prayers in cases of bad
harvest ... or epidemic diseases” (Ta’a, 1994: 677).
Bakare Godana chose Wacha as the place of his residence
because of the following reasons: Waacha was rich in water
supply since it was surrounded by streams and springs. It
was also economically rich because it was located near the
Handaq forest which was endowed by resources such as
ivory, cotton, honey, and other valuable products. Waacha
had also a strategic significance since it was easy to attack
or control the movement of the enemy from there.
It is superficial to discuss about the quality of life and
public services in Oromian cities and towns without
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5.

6.

having some understanding of the general political,
economic, and social conditions in the Ethiopian
Empire. In the early 1990s, out of the total population
of 53,130,780, only 7,315687 were living in urban areas
(Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority, 1994: 41). Economic and health indicators of Ethiopia show the severity of the hardship the powerless people like the Oromo
face. Ethiopia is one of the three poorest countries in the
world, and its per capita income was only 116 U. S. dollars
in 1997. Life expectancy is only 45 years. The mortality
rate for children less than five years is 177 per 1,000 live
births. The infant mortality rate is 113 per 1,000 live
births. The maternal mortality rate is 1, 400 per 100,000
births. Millions of people die of a simple disease because
of lack of medical treatment. Less than half of the population has access to basic sanitation, and only 25 percent of
the population has access to clean water (WHO, 1998).
HIV/AIDS is having serious negative consequences. In
1997, 2,600,000 adults and children were infected with
HIV/AIDS. Number of children orphaned by AIDS
since the beginning of epidemic was 840,000. Although
Oromos have been providing the majority of resources on
which people in Ethiopia survive due to their numerical
strength and abundant economic resources, such as land,
natural resources, and labor, they do not have a reasonable access to public facilities and institutions.
The policies of the Ethiopian state are different in
Ethiopia proper and the colonized regions. This state
is authoritarian to Amhara and Tigrayan communities
because it imposes dictatorship on them, and it is terrorist to the colonized peoples like the Oromos because it
rules them through state-terrorism and massive human
rights violations.
The 1994 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia
do not provide vital information on education, poverty
and disease in relation to ethnonational groups.
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7.

These pamphlets include Kana Beekta? and The Oromos:
Voice Against Tyranny. For the first time the original
name of this people, Oromo was used in publication by
rejecting the derogatory name, Galla.
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